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Background: Regional differences in physician supply can be found in many health care systems, regardless of
their organizational and financial structure. A theoretical model is developed for the physicians’ decision on office
allocation, covering demand-side factors and a consumption time function.
Methods: To test the propositions following the theoretical model, generalized linear models were estimated to
explain differences in 412 German districts. Various factors found in the literature were included to control for
physicians’ regional preferences.
Results: Evidence in favor of the first three propositions of the theoretical model could be found. Specialists show
a stronger association to higher populated districts than GPs. Although indicators for regional preferences are
significantly correlated with physician density, their coefficients are not as high as population density.
Conclusions: If regional disparities should be addressed by political actions, the focus should be to counteract
those parameters representing physicians’ preferences in over- and undersupplied regions.
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Regional differences in the physician-population ratio
are a reality in most countries, even in those with a
social health insurance or a national health service [1].
Germany is no exception, and there is an ongoing debate
in whether physician supply (i.e., the number of
practicing physicians) fits the needs (i.e., number and
morbidity of inhabitants) of the population and how
differences in regional physician supply can be overcome
(e.g., Ozegowski and Sundmacher [2,3]; Kistemann and
Schröer [4]). The permission to open a practice within a
certain area is regulated by the 17 Associations of Statutory
Health Insurance Physicians—Kassenärztliche Vereinigung
(ASHIPs) since 1993 within each of the 16 states of
Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia is covered by two
ASHIPs). For each of the 412 districts in Germany (which
represent the second smallest administrative level), a* Correspondence: stefan.scholz@uni-bielefeld.de
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(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zephysician supply rate is calculated as the percentage of
current physicians per inhabitants in relation to the physi-
cians in the year 1990 (specialists) or 1995 (physicians). A
time constant ratio between physicians and population
therefore corresponds to a supply rate of 100%. Physicians
are only allowed to open a new practice location within a
district whose supply rate lies beneath 110%. Following a
new legislation (GKV-Versorgungsstrukturgesetz (GKV-
VStG)) in 2012, this needs-based planning procedure is
not only based on the absolute number of persons living in
the planning area but supplemented by its demographic
structure (share of persons over 65 years) to calculate the
number of physicians allowed to practice in this area.
Nevertheless, there are still significant, historically grown
regional differences in physician supply. The average
supply rate in Germany was 126.5% over all groups of
physicians in 2010 with a minimum of 93.0% for general
practitioners (GPs) in Saxony-Anhalt and a maximum
of 266.2% for surgeons in Mecklenburg Western
Pomerania [5].is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
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how to equalize the physician-population ratio between
the different districts, and some federal state governments
have imposed measures to give incentives to physicians to
move to so-called underserviced areas (supply rate <75%).
Thereby, the legal actions on the planning procedure as
well as the incentives focus on the supply side and were
taken without any theoretical and empirical basis [6,7]. It
is surprising that the demand-side factors play a minor
role, since in reality they may actually play a role as the
studies from Newhouse [8], Krishnan [9], and Russo et al.
[10] have shown. The need for physicians’ services is
dependent on the morbidity of the population, which is
known to show large regional differences [11]. In addition,
it may be more burdensome in rural areas to visit a
physician’s practice due to the lack of public transporta-
tion and longer traveling times. In this case, differences in
physician-population ratio can be explained by lower
patient-population ratio. Incentives for physicians to move
to areas with a low physician-population ratio would
increase overall allocative efficiency.
So far, a variety of research has focused on different as-
pects of physicians’ behavior, such as physician-induced
demand, e.g., Busato and Kunzi [12], Farley [13],
Hemenway and Fallon [14], Jaegher and Jegers [15], and
Rice and Labelle [16], or the influence of competition on
practice patterns, e.g., Davis et al. [17], Folland and Stano
[18], or Reinhardt [19]. However, there are only a few
publications directly examining the process of practice-
location allocation. Wennberg et al. [20] developed a
conceptual framework on how planning for physician
supply should be implemented but lack a theoretical
model to explain regional differences in physician supply.
On an empirical basis, Cooper et al. [21] showed on a
macro-level that economic development is positively asso-
ciated with physician supply as well as with related
utilization. The studies from Ricketts and Randolph [22],
Ricketts [23], and Ricketts [24] analyzed what factors of
departure- and destination-district as well as physician
characteristics influence the decision of practice location
by moving physicians.
Unfortunately, as these studies are set in the U.S., their
transferability to other countries is limited, and more
generally, it remains unanswered whether these implica-
tions also apply for small areas within a country or for
all physician and not just for moving physicians.
The aim of the present paper is to provide a theoretical
framework to model physician behavior with regard to
practice-location allocation which is transferable to other
health care systems. The model is examining the influence
of various factors on the regional distribution of medical
practices as a basis to systematically tackle the problem of
regional differences in physician supply. The model leads
to some hypotheses as a basis for the empirical verificationas the second part of the study. German data is used for
this verification, and the combined results of the theore-
tical and empirical model are discussed in the rear section
of the paper.
Theoretical model
General motivation and model layout
In theory, the spatial differences of physicians can be ex-
plained by demand-side as well as by supply-side factors.
The regional distribution of physicians is usually seen as
a market failure due to physician-induced demand (see
Richardson and Peacock [25], van Dijk et al. [26]) calling
for governmental intervention. Our model does not as-
sume that physicians are able to induce demand for their
services, so that the physician density in a given region
is determined by the patients’ demand and the regional
preferences of the physician (see for physician regional
preferences Matsumoto et al. [27]). A more detailed
overview of supply-side factors from the literature is
given and examined in the last part of this section.
The theoretical model has four parts. The first part
presents a model of the demand-side. It is a simple model
of a representative individual who demands services by
general practitioners (family doctors) and specialists, as
we are also interested in the composition of the physician
in urban and rural areas. In the second part, a consump-
tion time function is introduced. Our hypothesis is that
search, traveling, and waiting time play an important role
for the consumer for his or her decision to consult a
doctor. The higher the time cost to consume a doctor, the
lower is the demand. With this approach, we incorporate
a well-known argument already raised by the seminar
article of Phelps and Newhouse [28].
The third part presents a model for physicians deciding
to settle in a certain region. We assume that physicians
like other professionals are interested in income which is
the revenues deducted by the cost of running the office. In
the fourth and final part, we derive the regional equilib-
rium to determine the physician-population ratio in urban
and rural areas. In this part, we also introduce a factor
covering the regional preferences of physicians. We
assume that a physician who settles in a more preferred
region is willing to sacrifice for this part of his or her in-
come. A regional equilibrium is reached, if every physician
belonging to a certain specialty earns the same income
weighted by the regional preference factor.
In our model, we assume two regions, an urban (u)
and a rural one (r). Both regions have the same popula-
tion (n = nu = nr) but differ in their size measured in
square miles or square kilometers m. The size of the
rural region is mr and of the urban area mu (mu <mr).
Thus, the population density n/m is higher in u than in r.
The regional physician density is GP/m and specialist
(SP)/m, where GP and SP are the number of practitioners
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capita is GP/n and SP/n.
It is assumed that there is no regional difference in
morbidity or demographics, with all consumers and phy-
sicians having the same preferences and physicians—as
mentioned above—not being able to induce demand.
There are no quality differences between physicians, and
the services provided are homogeneous.
Demand for physicians’ services
We consider a representative individual that has a fixed in-
come of y, which is spent solely for consumption. The ex-
penditure for consumption—except physician services—is
Y. The payment for health insurance is payroll tax on in-
come y at a tax rate b. A and S are the services of general
practitioners and specialists, respectively. p is the price for
those services. That means pA is the price for one unit of
services by a GP. pS is the price for consulting a SP. á
represents the co-insurance rate, so that the patient has
out-of-pocket payments of ápA or ápS for a service unit of
a GP or a SP. Thus, the monetary constraint for consump-
tion is given by
y ¼ Y þ b y þ á pA A þ á pS S ð1Þ
The consumer has also a time constraint with his or
her time budget being l. This is distributed on consump-
tion time L and for the time consulting a doctor. The
time coefficients ti (with i = A,S) are the time needed to
see a physician, including travel time, waiting time, and
consultation time.
l ¼ L þ tA A þ tS S ð2Þ
To sum up, the consumer spends his or her money
and time either for physician services or for other con-
sumption. The resources (money and time) taken for
other consumptions are expressed by
Z ¼ Y þ ϱL ð3Þ
where ϱ denotes the individual’s opportunity cost of time.
In a perfect world with flexible work time, it would corres-
pond to the wage rate (see, for example, Frank [29]).
To finalize the demand model, it is assumed that the
individual maximizes a utility function. To receive
concrete results, this function is specified. We assume a
Cobb-Douglas-type utility function:
U ¼ AaSsZz; s > a ð4Þ
This type of function has plausible properties as
described in the literature. s > a means that specialists’
activities are preferred over GPs’ activities, but GPs’
activities cannot be fully substituted by specialists’ activities
and vice versa. Obviously, both types of services are needed,
but a partial substitution is possible. Our assumption thatpatients may substitute one physician type for another if
needed is in line with general observations and empirical
studies. McLeod [30] showed, with data from the Canadian
Community Health Survey and the Ontario Health
Insurance Program, that a shortage in the supply of
one physician type can result in an increase in the
use of other physician types.
Our model does not cover the fact that the demand
for specialists’ services can be the result of referrals of
general practitioners. In some countries, like Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland, patients may consult a specialist
directly without a referral from a family doctor. In other
countries, like Great Britain, a family doctor has to be con-
sulted first before going to a specialist. In some countries,
in addition, specialists do only work in hospitals. Gächter
et al. [31] have shown for Austria that referrals from GPs
to SPs play a role and that GPs and SPs collaborate with
each other, so that both markets are interrelated.
Inserting the monetary constraint (1) and the time
constraint (2) in (3) leads to
0 ¼ Z – y þ b y þ á pA A þ á pS S − ϱ l
þ ϱ tA A þ ϱ tS S ð5Þ
The (representative) individual maximizes his or her
utility function (6) subject to (5), whereby Q is the
maximization operator and λ a Lagrange multiplier,
which is used to maximize an objective function under
constraints.
max Q ¼ AaSsZz þ λ½Z – y þ by þ ápAA
þ ápSS − ϱl þ ϱtAA þ ϱtSS ð6Þ
Differentiating (6) with respect to A, S, Z, and λ leads
to the first-order conditions for an optimal consumption
plan. If we divide these conditions pairwise, we obtain
S
A
¼ ápA þ ϱ tAð Þ
ápS þ ϱ tSð Þ
s
a
ð7Þ
Z
S
¼ ápS þ ϱtSð Þ
z
s
ð8Þ
Z
A
¼ ápA þ ϱtAð Þ
z
a
ð9Þ
As the model is constructed, the relative demand for
services of GPs and SPs and the demand for other con-
sumptions depend on the insurance coverage, the price
of other consumptions, the time needed to consume
physician services, and the preferences expressed by the
coefficients in the utility function.
If, for instance, the time needed to consume specialist
services, ts, is higher or the preference for those services
is lower, the demand for services of general practitioners
A will be higher relative to S and Z in the utility-
maximizing consumption plan.
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and Z, respectively. This allows us to replace S and Z in
(5) by (7) to (9), so that only the variable A is left and S
and Z have been replaced. We obtain
ápA þ ϱtAð Þ
z
a
A−y 1−bð Þ−l þ ápA þ ϱtAð ÞA
þ ápS þ ϱtSð Þ
ápA þ ϱtAð Þ
ápS þ ϱtSð Þ
s
a
A ¼ 0:
ð10Þ
This leads after reorganization to
A ¼ a y 1−bð Þ þ ϱlð Þ
ápA þ ϱtAð Þ aþ z þ sð Þ
: ð11Þ
In the same way, we can derive from (7) to (10) the
equation for S:
S ¼ s y 1−bð Þ þ ϱlð Þ
ápS þ ϱtSð Þ aþ z þ sð Þ
: ð12Þ
By multiplying the number of inhabitants in each
region with the demand for physician services, we
receive the demand for the whole region, i.e., nAu, nAr,
nSu, and nSr. This demand is dependent on the number
of inhabitants (which is assumed to be n and the same
in each region); the preferences expressed by a, s, and z;
the net income (1 − b)y, the monetary cost ápA (which is
larger than 0 if the co-insurance á is positive); and the
time cost ϱtS to consume the services (which are differ-
ent in the regions due to difference in traveling time). If
we divide nAu, nAr, nSu, and nSr by the number of physi-
cians, e.g., GPu, GPr, SPu, and SPr, we receive the average
number of services provided by each physician.
Time cost
The time cost to consult a physician includes travel time,
waiting time, and time of consultation. Traveling time
and by this time cost decrease with the average regional
distance between physicians’ practices. Whereas in urban
areas the nearest doctor’s office can be reached in just a
few minutes, travel times (hence time cost) in rural areas
are more considerable.
Following this argument, we assume the following
time cost function:
tAi ¼
GPi
mi
 −qA
; with i ¼ u; rf g; 0 < qj
< 1; qS > qA ð13Þ
tSi ¼
SPi
mi
 −qS
ð14Þ
where GPi stands for the number of general practi-
tioners, SPi for the number of specialists, and i for the
region. mi measures the size of the region. Although the
population is assumed to be the same in both regions,the rural region is larger than the urban one. qA and qS
are the time cost coefficients. If qj (j = A,S) is 0, the time
cost does not vary with the physician density. If qj is 1,
the time cost varies proportional with the physician
density. We assume qj to be between 0 and 1.
The explanation for the chosen time cost equation is as
follows: The time cost is dependent on various factors, but
also on the regional physician density, because the average
travel time increases for the patients if there are fewer
physician offices in the region. If the number of physicians
goes up in a certain region, the time cost will decrease and
q is assumed to be smaller than 1, because the traveling
time is only one component of the time needed to visit a
physician’s office. The patient also has to invest time to
search for the right physician, needs the waiting time in
the office, and the time for the treatment itself. q smaller
than 1 also implies that the demand for physician services
does not grow faster than the number of physicians, i.e.,
the time-cost-physician elasticity is smaller than 1.
It is plausible that it takes more time to find an appro-
priate specialist, due to the increasing variety of specialists.
Because the scarcity of certain specialists in large areas
also increases travel time, we assume qA < qS.
Physician behavior
The third part of the model specifies physician behavior.
For simplicity, we assume that physicians have some
regional preferences, which we will introduce in the next
section, but are interested in their income. So physicians
move to that region where they receive a higher income.
The prices for the physicians’ services are the same in
both regions but differ between the types of physicians,
e.g., they are pA and pS. Assuming constant marginal cost
and that all physicians have the same number of patients
in a given region, the income of a GP and a SP in a rural
or urban region is as follows, where YAi and YSi with i = u,
r are the income of a physician in the urban and the rural
region, respectively, and cA and cS are the marginal cost for
one service unit of a GP or a SP, respectively:
YAi ¼ pA−cAð Þ Ain=GPi with i ¼ u; r ð15Þ
YSi ¼ pS−cSð Þ Sin=GPi with i ¼ u; r ð16Þ
with j = {GP, SP}, i = {u, r}.
If physicians are free to choose where to open their
practice, in a state of equilibrium, physicians’ incomes
are the same in both regions:
YAr ¼ w YAu ; w ≥ 1 ð17Þ
and
YSr ¼ w YSu ; w ≥ 1 ð18Þ
w expresses the regional preference of physicians. If w is
1, physicians have no regional preferences. If it is greater
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sacrifice part of their income to live in a preferred re-
gion. Physicians are producers and as well as consumers,
and they choose to go to places for many reasons. One
reason is certainly to have enough patients. But as a con-
sumer, other reasons are important, like attractiveness,
cost of living, and personal tasks.
It is certainly a rough simplification to assume that
urban areas are always more attractive for physicians
than rural ones. For instance, Matsumoto et al. [23] have
shown in a study on Japanese physicians that the attract-
iveness of a municipality depends on the amenities of
urban life which seems to be more highly correlated with
the number of “daytime population” and “service industry
population” than total population. Erus and Bilir [32] have
published recently results from a Turkish study,
which shows that after the regulation was lifted that
young doctors have to go first in underserved regions;
socio-economic conditions of a region became a sig-
nificant determinant of availability of specialists. So it
is important to detect the factors or proxies for the
attractiveness of a region.
Regional equilibrium
In the next, final part of the model, we bring together
the three previous parts of the model and derive some
conclusions. We insert (11) to (16) in (17) and (18) and
receive for á = 0 the following equations:
GPu
GPr
¼ mr
mu
  qA
1−qA
w
1
1−qA ð19Þ
SPu
SPr
¼ mr
mu
  qS
1−qS
w
1
1−qS ð20Þ
(19) and (20) show that the number of physicians and
hence the physician density is larger in urban than in
rural areas, because the right-hand side is greater than 1.
The urban-rural discrepancy increases if the regional
preference for urban areas increases.
Dividing (20) by (19) yields to
SPu
GPu
¼ SPr
GPr
mr
mu
  qS−qA
1−qAð Þ 1−qSð Þ ð21Þ
Obviously, the specialist-general practitioner relationship
is higher in urban than in rural areas if qA < qs.
Our model leads to four hypotheses:
1. Regional preferences of physicians lead to differences in
regional physician-population ratio, even if physicians
are not able to induce demand for their services. In our
model, the preferences of physicians for urban areas
are reflected by the parameter w. We will introduce anumber of proxies for the attractiveness of a region in
our empirical analysis.
2. If physicians have no regional preference, it is also
plausible that the physician-population ratio for each
specialist group is higher in regions with a high-
population density than in rural areas. If traveling
and waiting time plays a role for the demand for
physician services, and these time costs are high in a
given region because the physician-population ratio
is low, the demand will increase, if the physician-
population ratio increases.
3. Not only the absolute number of specialists but also
the GP-specialist ratio is higher in urban than in
rural areas, if search and travel time costs are higher
for specialists. As the two first propositions derived
from the model are straightforward, the third
proposition needs to be explained. The reason is the
heterogeneity of specialists compared with general
practitioners. The more different types of specialists
exist, the higher are the time costs to find the right
doctor for the patient’s specific health problem. An
increase in the number of physicians will increase
the demand for their services due to the reduced time
cost. But this effect is larger for SPs than for GPs.
4. The higher the level of insurance coverage of
physician services or the lower the co-payments,
the higher the regional inequality of outpatient care.
This can be derived directly from our model. If,
for instance, á is set equal to 1 instead of 0, the
monetary cost increases. By this, the relative
importance of the time cost decreases.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 make clear that it is an empirical
question whether differences in physician-population
ratio are really a sign of market failure. The question is
whether and to which extent demand differences or re-
gional preferences of the physicians are associated with
the differences in physician-population ratio. One factor
causing demand differences is the time cost associated
with medical treatment. Other factors are morbidity
differences. While the regional physician-population
ratio and the size of a region are known, the challenge
of an empirical study will be to detect the right proxies
for the demand for medical services and the attractive-
ness of a region.
The model is simple and, not surprisingly, it has a
number of limitations. One limitation of the model is
the assumption that physicians are income maximizers.
If physicians behave in a purely altruistic manner, then the
model does not correctly describe physician behavior.
However, our hypothesis that monetary incentives are one
of the main drivers for the decision of setting up a practice
is confirmed by Günther et al. [33]. In a survey conducted
among 14 939 German practicing non-postgraduate
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to weight the attributes of hypothetical locations for prac-
tices. Income was weighted with the highest utility weight.
Physician preferences and supplementing factors
However, other parameters also play a role in the deci-
sion for a certain location, and it is important for the
empirical validation of our model to find appropriate
proxies not only for demand but also for the supply side
from the literature. Also in the study of Günther et al.
[33], the authors found the attributes professional
cooperation, leisure activities, career opportunities of the
partner, and availability of child care followed the utility
weight of income in descending order from qualitative
interviews. Thereby, the last three attributes were equal-
ized by the driving distance. This survey also included a
questionnaire asking physicians about the importance of
18 items on their decision for a practice location. Using
factor and regression analysis on the results of the
questionnaire, Roick et al. [34] found financial incentives
to be less important than a positive environment for the
family and occupational duties. On the other hand,
possibilities for cooperation, conditions of service, and
quality of life in their living area in descending order are
of lower relevance.
The study from Kazanjian and Pagliccia [35] used a
very similar methodological framework as Roick et al.
[34] to retrospectively analyze Canadian physicians’
choice of practice location in 1989. The authors focused
on physicians’ satisfaction with the location of their
current practice on the basis of 41 items as well as on
persons and events influencing the decision for this
location and thereby differentiate between physicians
practicing in rural and urban areas. Physicians’ spouses,
the desire to raise a family in an environment similar to
that of their own childhood, peers, and friends have the
highest influence on the location of physicians’ practices.
Nevertheless, income and other location factors are only
part of the equation when analyzing satisfaction with the
current location of practice and therefore do not allow
any conclusions to be drawn between them and the
primary choice of residence.
An empirical model from Breyer et al. [36] analyzed
the determinants of utilizing physician services and
the supply side in Germany. It showed that the deter-
minants of physician supply are explained by per
capita expenditure for physician services, population
density, gross domestic product (GDP) of the region,
hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants, and overnight
stays in hotels. The last two parameters are assumed
to cover the distance to the physicians’ training
location, i.e., university hospital, and the cultural and
recreational appeal of a region. In the regression analysis,
only expenditure for physicians, hospital bed density, andovernight stays in hospitals showed a significant associ-
ation with the physician density.
A comprehensive analysis has also been conducted by
Kistemann and Schröer [4]. In this study, the target and
actual numbers of GPs and different specialists are
compared in a German district on the postal-code
level as a function of the portion of inhabitants of
high socioeconomic status. In an additional postal
survey, physicians were asked about the importance
of economic and personal factors on the decision for
their current practice location. The authors found an
equal number of non-economic and economic factors
being rated “important”.
As these publications reveal, economic incentives, mea-
sured either directly over the expenditure for physician
services as in Breyer et al. [36] or indirectly over the popu-
lation density as in our model, are not exclusively respon-
sible for physicians’ decision regarding the location of their
practice. Instead, the professional environment for the
physician, a labor market for the physicians’ spouses, the
accessibility of cultural and recreational activities, and the
attractiveness of a district are contributing factors to this
decision. The following empirical analysis seeks to examine
to what extent the propositions of our model can be found
in German outpatient care and which other spatial factors
are associated with the number of GPs and specialists.
Empirical evidence
Data
The data for the analysis were obtained using datasets
from different sources. The absolute number of physicians
of different disciplines has been made available by the
federal ASHIP for the year 2010 for 412 German districts.
The independent variables on the district level have been
combined with respect to the findings in the literature
under the topics population, morbidity, and financial
incentives for the demand-side factors and health care
system, culture, labor/economy, attractiveness, and infra-
structure for the regional preferences of the physicians,
i.e., the supply side. Population parameters correspond to
the parameters used in the German governmental plan-
ning procedure and include the overall number of inhabi-
tants in the year 2010, which were available by age and
sex from the German Federal Statistical Office [37]. The
old-age dependency ratio, which was calculated in ac-
cordance to Rawland [38] using these data, represents
the morbidity of the population in combination with
the sex-specific life expectancy and the overall mor-
tality of a district. To capture financial incentives of a
district, the mean household income and the share of
privately insured patients were used [39]. Private
health care insurance in Germany follows a different
reimbursement scheme offering physicians a higher
level of remuneration.
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system, the respective number of hospital and nursing
home beds as well as the presence of a university hospital
have been included to account for the possibility of co-
operation with other doctors. The number of middle-
order (defined as cities providing specialist doctors, shop-
ping malls, cinemas, hospitals, public swimming pools,
and legal counselors) and high-order centers (defined as
cities additionally providing special shops, hospitals, and
cultural, educational, and administrative institutions) can
be seen as variables describing more densely populated
areas, thus offering higher cultural variety. Supplemented
by the location of state capitals and cities with more than
100 000 inhabitants, these variables are summarized as the
culture of a district. Covering the labor market for physi-
cians’ spouses, the unemployment rate, the rate of highly
qualified workers, and the gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita were included under the term labor market and
economy of a district. The last category of independent
variables contains the attractiveness of a district, measured
by the number of guest-nights in tourist enterprises per
capita, the difference in persons having moved perman-
ently to and from the district in the last 5 and 10 years, re-
spectively, and the intensity of exchange of real estate.
Finally, the average travel time to the nearest airport,
high-speed train station, middle-order and high-order
centers for 2010 were used as infrastructure variables for
each district to depict not only provision of cultural
variety in more densely populated areas by the physicians
but also their accessibility from inside or outside the
district as patients might also consult physicians in other
districts besides their residence. Except for the population
parameters, the data were extracted from the INKAR
dataset of the Federal Institute for Research on Building,
Urban Affairs and Spatial Development [40] for the year
2010, unless stated otherwise. All variables used in the
analyses are shown in Table 1. Variables which are not
shown in the results did not contribute to the model
significantly. In addition, data from the Association of
German University Hospitals was used for identifying
districts with university hospitals [41]. As only secondary
data was used in the analyses, no ethical approval or
patient consent was necessary.
Analytical method
Three separate models were estimated using the density
of GPs per 10 000 inhabitants, the density of general
specialistsa per 10 000 inhabitants, and the ratio between
the absolute number of GPs divided by the absolute
number of general specialists as dependent variables. As
the number of physicians can be seen as numeric
count data taking no zero values, a generalized linear
model (GLM) with log-link using a zero-truncated
negative-binomial distribution was estimated using thelogarithmized number of 10 000 inhabitants as an offset,
thus estimating physician density [42]. By considering
varying intercepts on the ASHIP level, the model accounts
for possible correlations in the number of physicians be-
tween districts lying in the same ASHIP region (the value
for each ASHIP can be found in Additional file 1). The
first two models were also carried out using physician and
population density under the assumption of a normally
distributed physician density. As the physician density was
positively skewed and showed some outliers, the use of a
GLM model was preferred. Furthermore, Poisson regres-
sion was omitted because of over-dispersed data. The
model takes the following form with g() being a log-link
function and αi and αk representing the intercepts of the
district and the corresponding ASHIP, respectively. The
logarithm of the inhabitants serves as the offset.
g yik
  ¼ αk þ αi þ Xβþ offset log inhabitantsið Þð Þ
þ ε
Where applicable, the independent variables were trans-
formed to z-scores by subtracting the mean and subse-
quently dividing by two standard deviations to allow a
coherent interpretation between metric and binary vari-
ables [43]. Therefore, the intercept needs to be interpreted
as a predictive mean value which correlates to the imput-
ation of the mean values of the independent variables, and
the coefficients of z-scored variables need to be inter-
preted as the effect of an increase or decrease of the
variable by two standard deviations. To retain comparabil-
ity between the three models, variables showing signifi-
cance at the 0.05 level in at least one of the models are
kept in all the models. The analyses were started by in-
cluding all explanatory variables, with interactions being
considered where reasonable. To receive the final model,
coefficients and their corresponding interactions were
excluded from the model in a backward stepwise
manner, starting with excluding the variable with the
highest P value. Regression diagnostics are provided
in Additional file 1. All analyses were performed with
R version 3.0.1 using the package gamlss [44,45].
Results
General practitioners
The regression model for GPs estimates a logarithmized
(log) physician density of 1.765 (=5.81 GPs per 10 000
inhabitants) in a district in the ASHIP of Brandenburg
with a mean population density, household income,
share of privately insured persons, number of hospital
beds, number of middle- and high-order centers, having
no state capital or city having more than 100 000 inhabi-
tants, mean rates of highly qualified workers and un-
employment, a mean migration balance of the last 5 years,
Table 1 Dependent and independent variables on district level (n = 412)
Topic Metric variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Dependent Density of GPs (per 10 000 inhabitants) 6.32 0.99 1.52 12.58
Density of specialists (per 10 000 inhabitants) 3.14 1.35 0.51 8.99
Ratio GPs/specialists 2.30 0.99 0.75 12.80
Demand/need factors
Population Population density (per km2) 518.68 674.91 37.09 4355.28
Morbidity Old-age dependency ratio 32.14 4.22 22.03 45.53
Life-expectancy women (from 60 years) 25.08 0.63 23.10 27.10
Life-expectancy men (from 60 years) 21.56 0.94 19.40 24.60
Mortality (deaths per 1000 inhabitants) 10.91 1.59 6.90 15.40
Financial incentives Household income (in €, per month) 1548.93 199.31 1157.90 2585.00
Rate of privately insured persons (%) 13.46 4.32 3.53 27.00
Control factors
Health care system No. of hospital beds (per 10 000 inhabitants) 64.49 38.70 0.00 215.90
No. of nursing home beds (per 10 000 inhabitants) 108.94 28.83 47.10 256.60
Cultural No. of middle-order centers 2.24 2.16 0.00 11.00
No. of high-order centers 0.39 0.56 0.00 4.00
Labor/economy Unemployment rate (%) 7.41 3.31 1.90 17.40
Rate of highly qualified workers (%) 8.23 3.80 3.00 26.50
GDP per capita (in €1000) 27.58 10.24 13.20 83.60
Attractiveness Touristic attractiveness 5.27 7.56 0.00 90.60
Building area attractiveness 125.47 117.34 0.00 1031.80
Migration balance (last 10 years) 4.54 46.13 −171.40 100.30
Migration balance (last 5 years) −3.98 21.85 −69.80 61.80
Infrastructure Travel time to airport 54.41 24.11 7.60 161.50
Travel time high-speed train station 22.36 14.42 0.00 61.60
Travel time middle-order center 8.26 6.40 0.00 36.60
Travel time high-order center 26.56 17.83 0.00 76.20
Binary variables Frequency Percentage
Cultural State capital 16/412 3.88
City >100 000 inhabitants 68/412 16.50
Health care system University hospital 33/412 8.01
Infrastructure District in former East Germany 86/412 20.87
Urban district 206/412 50.00
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nearest airport and middle-order center,.
As can be seen from Table 2, population density alone is
significantly negative associated with a decrease of −0.136
in the log physician density in the GP model. Neverthe-
less, population density is strongly interacting with the
presence of a city with more than 100 000 inhabitants,
balancing out the negative association between population
and GP density to some extent (to −0.037). The strongest
positive association with GP density can be found for the
presence of a state capital in one district (0.127) followed
by the number of hospital beds with 0.073. Thecoefficients of the travel time to the nearest airport, the
touristic attractiveness, the share of privately insured
persons, and the number of high-order centers are also
significantly, positively, and equally strongly associated
with a higher GP density. This might also be true for the
unemployment rate, although its P value lies just over the
0.05 significance level.
The only variable indicating a significant and negative
correlation with the GP density is the travel time to the
next middle-order center. This means a higher travel
time indicates a lower GP density. The effects of the dif-
ferent ASHIPs are statistically significant for 10 of 16
Table 2 Results of the three zero-truncated, negative binomial GLMs for GP density, specialists density, and ratio of GPs
divided by specialists
Topic Coefficients General physicians Specialists Ratio GPs/specialists
Estimate P value Estimate P value Estimate P value
Intercept 1.736 0.000*** 1.919 0.000*** −0.178 0.003**
Population Population density (per km2) (z-score) −0.136 0.005** 0.349 0.000*** −0.453 0.000***
Financial incentives Household income (z-score) 0.018 0.255 0.093 0.001** −0.088 0.001**
Share of privately insured persons (z-score) 0.042 0.008** 0.123 0.000*** −0.063 0.033*
Health care No. of hospital beds (z-score) 0.073 0.000*** 0.253 0.000*** −0.206 0.000***
Cultural Number of middle-order centers (z-score) −0.005 0.703 −0.074 0.004** 0.052 0.038*
Number of high-order centers (z-score) 0.036 0.003** 0.057 0.022* −0.022 0.336
City in district (binary) −0.021 0.476 0.146 0.005** −0.140 0.008**
State capital in district (binary) 0.127 0.000*** 0.278 0.000*** −0.096 0.244
Labor/economy Rate of highly qualified workers (z-score) 0.019 0.264 0.106 0.001** −0.099 0.001**
Unemployment rate (z-score) 0.052 0.064 0.139 0.006** −0.073 0.142
Attractiveness Touristic attractiveness (z-score) 0.046 0.000*** −0.004 0.861 0.036 0.116
Migration balance (last 5 years) (z-score) −0.012 0.478 0.072 0.025* −0.113 0.000***
Infrastructure Travel time to the nearest airport (z-score) 0.049 0.000*** 0.021 0.420 0.016 0.548
Travel time to middle-order center (z-score) −0.064 0.007** −0.177 0.000*** 0.115 0.004**
Interactions Population density: city in district 0.099 0.044* −0.422 0.000*** 0.464 0.000***
GoF-measures Sigma (global deviance) −8.177 0.000*** −3.763 0.000*** −3.892 0.000***
BIC score first model 3260 4125 3979
BIC score final model 3162 3828 3751
* < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
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Brandenburg having the lowest GP density. The highest
significant coefficient can be found for the ASHIP of
Saarland with 0.237. As the ASHIPs are not of primary
interest, further details can be found in Additional file 1.
Specialists
In the model for specialists, the estimated log density of
specialists is higher than the estimate for GP density. In
a hypothetical district with no city, state capital, and all
other variables at the sample mean, the model estimates
a log density of 1.919 corresponding to 6.81 specialists
per 10 000 inhabitants. In contrast to the GP model, the
population density shows the largest (highly significant)
association with the specialist density by 0.349. However,
this association is again strongly altered by the interac-
tions of population density with cities. With each in-
crease in population density by two standard deviations,
the specialist density decreases by 0.422 to −0.073 in a
district with a city. Having a city within the district’s
borders nevertheless increases the specialist density by
0.146 on its own.
The strongest positive associations of the other variables
with the specialist density could be found for the presence
of a state capital and the number of hospital beds. A
district with a state capital shows 2.18, and an increase oftwo standard deviations in hospital beds has 1.96 more
specialists per 10 000 inhabitants (0.278 and 0.253 in-
crease in log density, respectively). The coefficients of a
city in the district (0.146), the unemployment rate (0.139),
the share of privately insured (0.123), and the rate of
highly qualified workers (0.106) show also significant,
strong correlations with the specialist density. Weaker
positive effects can be seen for the household income,
migration balance, and the number of high-order centers.
Negative associations can be found as well for the
number of middle-order centers as for the travel time to
the next middle-order center. With −0.177, the first
shows the stronger coefficient, whereas with each two
standard deviation increases in the number of middle-
order centers, the log specialist density is 0.074 lower.
The highest difference of a single ASHIP is Berlin with
0.382, although it is only one of three ASHIPs showing a
significant association and there also negative coeffi-
cients. Again, details are given in Additional file 1.
GP-specialist ratio
The ratio of GPs divided by the specialists within a district
is analyzed in the last model. Thus, negative coefficients
are increasing the denominator denoting a higher share of
specialists and positive coefficients increasing the numer-
ator denoting a higher share of GPs. With all variables at
Scholz et al. Human Resources for Health  (2015) 13:85 Page 10 of 13the sample mean, the ratio of physicians in a rural district
in Brandenburg with no city or state capital is estimated
to be 0.837 (log = −178). As population density in-
creases by two standard deviations, the log density is
reduced by −0.453, implying a higher share of specialists
in districts with a higher population density. As with both
previous models, the interaction term drastically changes
the coefficient of population density in districts with a city.
The city variable itself is nonetheless associated with a
higher share of specialists (−0.150) and is the next stron-
gest coefficient to the number of hospital beds. An in-
crease of beds by two standard deviations from the mean
shows a decrease in the GP-specialist ratio of −0.206.
Weaker effects increasing the share of specialists can be
found with a higher migration balance of the last 5 years
(−0.113), a higher rate of highly qualified workers
(−0.099), a higher household income (−0.088), and share
of privately insured persons (−0.063).
The only two variables associated with a higher share
of GPs when positively deviating from the mean are the
travel time to middle-order centers (0.115) and the number
of middle-order centers (0.052). The only ASHIP showing
a significant difference in the GP-to-specialist ratio is
Bavaria with a higher share in GPs by 0.187.
Discussion
Interpretation of results
The present study analyzes regional differences in the
density of general practitioners, specialists, and the ratio
of GPs divided by specialists using a zero-truncated
negative-binomial linear model. Physician density was
estimated over independent variables concerning the
412 districts in Germany controlling for the different
spheres of responsibility of the 17 ASHIPs regulating the
distribution of physicians. For all three analyses, several
models have been estimated, and variables were kept in
the model if they showed statistical significance at the
0.05 level in any of the three models.
The respective densities of GPs and specialists show
strong associations with the population density of a
district. While the results from the specialist model are in
line with the prediction of our theoretical model suggest-
ing a positive correlation with the population density, GP
density seems to be negatively associated with population
density contradicting the theoretical conclusions.
In all models, significant interactions are changing the
coefficient of the population density substantially. At
first glance, the presence of a city seems to reverse the
respective association between population density and
physician density. Accordingly, these findings might
suggest that specialist density and the GP-specialist ratio
increase and GP density decreases with increasing popu-
lation density until some level of urbanization is reached.
This may be due to a historically grown higher densityin urban areas which has been capped by the needs-
based planning mechanism since 1995 or the saturation
of patient demand. Furthermore, the effects of some
variables from the supply side might be correlated with
population density, e.g., urban areas tend to have more
labor in the tertiary sector requiring highly qualified
workers or having a higher household income.
Surprisingly, the old-age dependency ratio, life expect-
ancy, and mortality as proxies for morbidity of the inhabi-
tants are not significantly correlated with the density of
GPs or specialists for data in 2010. This might be due to
governmental regulations not incorporating the popula-
tion age structure as a proxy for morbidity in the needs-
based planning until 2012 [46]. The proxies for financial
incentives only play a minor role as indicated by the
effects of household income and the share of privately
insured persons.
As can be seen from the coefficients of the supply-side
variables, regional preferences in terms of our theoretical
model take effect beside pure income maximization, i.e.,
this means that w > 1. For example, there is an increas-
ing effect of the cultural variables, clearly exemplified by
the specialist model, where the strong effect of state cap-
itals may be due to state-operas, -theaters, or -museums.
A higher touristic attractiveness of a district seems to in-
dicate a higher number of GPs. However, some coeffi-
cients seem to be counterintuitive as travel time to the
nearest airport in the first analysis and unemployment in
the first and second model are positive. This means that
a shorter travel time to the nearest airport and a lower
rate of unemployment are associated with a lower density
of physicians. While the travel time might be overruled by
other variables also covering airports, e.g., the number of
high-order centers or the touristic attractiveness of a
district, there might be another explanation for the
unemployment rate than being an artifact. As there is
evidence that unemployment causes negative effects on
mental [47] and physical health [48], the unemployment
rate may serve as a proxy for morbidity.
The effect size of the coefficients needs to be considered
carefully as the variables are standardized, and the coeffi-
cients indicate the change in the dependent variable if the
independent variable is changed by two standard devia-
tions from the mean. For example, as the minimum and
maximum of the rate of privately insured are only 1.1 and
1.6 double-standard deviations from the mean, the full
coefficient will not be used in the sample. In contrast, the
maximal touristic attractiveness lies 5.6 times from the
mean allowing for a greater overall effect of this variable.
In summary, the findings therefore provide some
evidence that the first hypothesis derived from the the-
oretical model that a higher density of physicians can be
found in districts with a higher population density. As
we have controlled for factors which are associated with
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physician density can be solely explained by patient
demand differences.
Compared to the number of GPs, the density of
specialists is generally more strongly associated with the
population density and other variables describing an
urbanized district. For example, a higher household in-
come and a higher travel time to the next middle-order
center indicate a higher density of specialists in compari-
son to the population parameters alone. These results
underscore the second hypothesis of the theoretical
model that a higher density of specialists might be even
be more associated with urban districts than is the case
of the density of GPs.
Furthermore, the third model analyzed the ratio
between GPs and specialists. The negative association
between this ratio and the population density supports
hypothesis number 3 from our theoretical model. Never-
theless, it must be stated that in this model as well the
interaction term weakens the effect of the population
density in urbanized areas. However, there still remains
a considerable effect, and other variables contribute to
the effect of population density on the ratio between
GPs and specialists.
Limitations
There are also a number of limitations that need to be
considered. First of all, not all the data used in the model
were available for the same year. However, the maximum
difference is 1 year, and it is assumed that no drastic
changes of the independent variables occurred within
this short period of time. Secondly, districts are politic-
ally administered borders leading to willfully varying
district sizes in the different states. Therefore, homogen-
eity of the explaining variables may be smaller in larger
districts reducing effect sizes and leading to an under-
estimation of the coefficient sizes. In addition, the num-
ber of physicians and the share of privately insured
patients in each district could not be retrieved from
official statistics. This makes it hard to validate or to
reconstruct the data, as, for example, the dataset of
privately insured persons is based on nearly 25% missing
values. With the number of physicians and a dummy
variable for eastern Germany as part of the predictive
variables used in the multiple imputation equations, it may
be that the number of GPs and specialists is—to a large
part—explained by the overall number of physicians [39].
Furthermore, the model did not consider random
slopes, although the number of physicians is regulated
by 17 independent ASHIPs. The varying intercept model
was chosen, as only minor differences in the criteria for
the distribution of physicians between the ASHIPs are
allowed by the planning regulations [26]. Nevertheless,
there might be differences in budget ceilings anddifferent degrees to which some services are reimbursed
between the ASHIPs. As data on this topic is not openly
available, it was not possible to control for those factors.
This is also true for factor of referrals between GPs and
specialists which might also effect the practice location
decision of a physician.
In this context, it should be mentioned that it might
also not be appropriate to assume linear effects of the
variables, thus ignoring saturation effects. Furthermore,
as the analyses were carried out using cross-sectional
data, no causal interpretations can be made. On the other
hand, the data used in this paper represent a complete
survey of German outpatient physicians and facilitate
reflecting the differences between the 17 ASHIPs respon-
sible for the allocation of physicians’ practices.
Conclusions
Differences in regional specialist supply can to some
extent be explained by differences in population density.
Other variables beyond the number of potential patients
and their demographic structure have influence on the
supply and demand side of the regional health care
markets. This might have important policy implications
in terms of the future selection of variables (like the
unemployment rate or the number of hospital beds) to
determine the medical need and possible undersupply by
governmental regulation bodies in a particular area.
Endnote
aAccording to the definition of the planning regulations,
specialists are ophthalmologists, surgeons, gynecologists,
dermatologists, otolaryngologists, neurologists, orthope-
dists, psychotherapists, urologists, and pediatricians [46].
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the different ASHIPs. The file contains a diagnostics GP-density model,
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